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CHAPTER 15 
Labor Relations 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS 
A. FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
§15.1. Civil rights and employment. ,Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964,1 also referred to as the Eqlial Employment Opportunity 
Act and the Federal Fair Employment Practice Law, deals with the 
employment phases of civil rights. This Title becomes effective 
July 2, 1965. It prohibits discrimination in employment because of 
an individual's race, color, religion, sex,2 or national origin. If for 
anyone of these reasons an employer fails or refuses to hire, or dis-
charges, or otherwise discriminates against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, it is an unfair employment practice. Also declared unfair 
practices are employment advertisements mentioning race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; segregation or classification for such 
reasons which tends to deprive an individual of employment op-
portunities or adversely affects his status as an employee; discrimina-
tion in the admission of employees to training programs and appren-
ticeship plans; and discrimination because an employee or applicant 
for employment has opposed an unlawful employment practice or 
has in any way participated in or assisted an investigation or proceed-
ing under the act. Labor unions and employment agencies are also 
prohibited from engaging in discriminatory practices based on an 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.8 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS is a partner in the firm of Morgan, Brown, Keams Be 
Joy, Boston. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of E. Carl Uehlein 
of the Board of Student Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
§15.1. 178 Stat. 2511, 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e (1964 Supp.). 
2 Massachusetts employers in businesses affecting interstate commerce will be 
subject to three laws regulating sex discrimination in employment, including 
Title VII. See 77 Stat. 56, 29 U.S.C.A. §206(d) (19611); G.L., c. 149, §§I05A-I05C. 
8 Specifically it is an unfair employment practice for a union: "(I) to exclude or 
to expel from its membership, or otherwise ,to discriminate against, any individual 
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
"(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or refuse 
to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive an individual of employment Oppol'tunities, or would limit such em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee 
or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or 
1
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An enforcement agency called the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) has been established by the act. When a charge 
of unfair employment practice is filed with it, it is required to in-
vestigate, and if it finds reasonable cause to believe that the charge 
is true, it will try to resolve the situation by conciliation. If the 
Commission fails to obtain voluntary compliance, it will send the 
aggrieved person written notice confirming this fact. Within thirty 
days after such written notification, the aggrieved person may file a 
civil action against the person alleged to have committed the unfair 
practice (employer, union, or employment agency) in the appropriate 
federal district court. If the court finds that the accused intentionally 
engaged in an unlawful employment practice, it may enjoin the 
practice and order affirmative action such as hiring or reinstatement 
with back pay. If the order is not complied with, contempt proceed-
ings may result in possible fine or imprisonment, or both. 
Title VII gives specific recognition to state antidiscrimination 
statutes, such as the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practice Law.4 
Where such state laws exist, charges must be filed initially with the 
state agency (such as the Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination), and the federal agency will become involved only after 
the state agency has finished its proceedings or has failed to act. The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is also authorized to 
cooperate with the state agency and utilize its services. 
Coverage of employers and unions, in industries affecting interstate 
commerce, is geared to the number of employees or members; those 
, having one hundred or more are covered beginning in 1965, while 
i those having twenty-five or more are not covered until 1968. The 
i act contains a number of exceptions,1i exemptions,6 and saving clauses, 
"(8) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an indi-
I vidual in violation of this section." 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2000e-2(c)(I) to 
I, 2000e-2(c)(8) (1964). 
" For an employment agency, it is an unfair employment practice to "fail or 
, refuse ,to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, an individual 
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national Origin, or to classify or refer 
for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. . . . Id. §2000e-2(b). 
4 G.L., c. 151B; 78 Stat. 259,42 U.S.C.A. §2000c-5b (1964). 
II Exceptions include: a. from the term "employer": the United States, a corpo-
ration wholly owned by the United States, Indian tribes, a state, or a subdivision 
of a state, and private clubs (except labor organizations); 
b. from the term "employment agency": all governmental agencies except the 
United States Employment Service and state or local employment agencies receiving 
federal aid. 78 Stat. 258, 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e (1964). 
Also excepted from the statute are (1) discriminatory action based on religion, 
sex, or national origin, if any such factor is a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business; (2) discharge of or 
failure to hire an employee who does not have security clearance where the em-
ployer is subject to security regulations; (8) differences in wages or employment 
conditions pursuant to a seniority, merit, piecework, or incentive system or due to 
different locations; (4) discrimination against members of the Communist Party or 
Communist-front organizations; (5) differences in pay based upon sex which are 
2
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including one which states that no affirmative action granting pref-
erential treatment or correcting imbalances on any percentage basis 
is to be required.7 There are record-keeping provisions8 and also a 
short statute of limitations. No proceedings may be initiated on a 
charge unless it is filed within ninety days after an alleged violation, 
except in states such as Massachusetts which have an applicable state 
law. In the latter event, the charge must be filed with the EEOC no 
later than thirty days after receipt of notice of termination of the 
state proceedings or 210 days after the alleged violation, whichever 
is earlier. 
B. FEDERAL DECISIONS 
§15.2. Pre-emption. The question of federal versus state juris-
diction in labor cases continued to be a fruitful source of litigation. 
In one case in which the Supreme Court of the United States, in line 
with previous decisions, held that a state court had no power to 
enjoin peaceful picketing, it so ruled in spite of the state appellate 
court's holding that the case had become moot.! The Supreme Court 
held that the question of mootness was itself one of federal law. 
A second case involving the pre-emption issue was Local 20, Team-
sters v. Morton.2 Here the union was sued in a federal district court 
for having caused damage to the plaintiff company by reason of its 
allegedly unlawful inducement to a boycott directed against secondary 
employers doing business with the plaintiff. The suit was based 
upon Section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act, which grants the right to 
civil damages for certain kinds of secondary boycott action, and also 
permitted by the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (Fair Labor Standards Act, §6(d), 29 
U.S.C.A. §206(d», namely, seniority, merit, piecework, and incentive systems, or 
any factor other than sex; and (6) preferential treatment to Indians by employers 
opera,ting on or near Indian reservations. 
6 Exemptions include an employer with respect to aliens employed outside any 
state; religious corporations, associations, or societies in carrying out religious 
activities; and educational institutions in employing persons to perform work 
connected with educational activities. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-l (1964). 
7Id. §2000e-2(j). See also 78 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-7 (1964), which states 
that this act does not relieve any liability incurred under any present or future 
state or local law, except those requiring an act which would be unlawful under 
this title, and 78 Stat. 265, 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-11 (1964), which preserves any laws 
or rules granting special rights or preferences for veterans. 
878 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-8(c) (1964), requires employers to make and 
keep records relevant to determinations of whether uniawful employment practices 
have been or are being committed. Such records are subject to the rules and regu-
lations set up by ,the EEOC. Employers are required to maintain a list of appli-
cants, in chronological order according to receipt of applications, who wish to 
participate in training programs. Relief may be granted when record-keeping and 
reporting impose an undue hardship. 
§15.2. 1 Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 84 Sup. Ct. 391, 11 L. Ed. 2d 30l 
(1964). 
2377 U.S. 252, 84 Sup. Ct. 1253. 12 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1964). 
3
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on Ohio common law. The trial court made separate findings on 
damages, awarding a certain amount for the Section 303 violation 
and other amounts for conduct found unlawful under Ohio law, but 
not prohibited by Taft-Hartley. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but the 
Supreme Court reversed except on the award of damages under Section 
303. The importance of the decision is that some of the secondary 
activities appear to have been "neither protected nor prohibited" by 
federal law. The Court specifically alluded to this and stated that 
it is still necessary to determine whether by enacting Section 303 
"Congress occupied this field and closed it to state regulation." The 
answer to the basic question of whether "incompatible doctrines of 
local law must give way to principles of federal labor law" ultimately 
depends upon "whether the application of state law ... would operate 
to frustrate the purpose of the federallegislation."11 
There were two United States Supreme Court labor law cases in 
which states were permitted to act. One involved Section 14(b) of 
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.· This is the section 
permitting states to enact so-called right-to-work laws, which outlaw 
union-security agreements. The Court held that not only the 
National Labor Relations Board, but the Florida courts as well have 
jurisdiction to enforce the state's prohibition against an agency shop 
clause.1> The conflict here between state and federal law is specifically 
sanctioned by Congress "with direction to give the right of way to 
state laws barring the execution and enforcement of union-security 
agreements."6 The Court noted that the rule of federal pre-emption 
in labor law cases "does not state a constitutional principle; it merely 
rationalizes the problem of coexistence between federal and state 
regulatory schemes in the field of labor relations."7 
The second case in which a state court was held to have jurisdiction 
in spite of a federal pre-emption contention was Carey v. Westing-
house Corp.8 Here Union A, representing production and mainte-
nance employees, brought suit against the company in the New York 
courts to compel arbitration of the question of whether certain em-
ployees in the engineering laboratory were performing production 
and maintenance work. These employees were represented by Union 
B, which had been certified by the NLRB as bargaining agent for all 
technical employees. The New York court held that the matter was 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, since it involved a 
definition of bargaining units, and therefore ordered dismissal of the 
suit to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed. The 
Court's decision is not surprising in view of its affection for labor 
II Id. at 258. 84 Sup. Ct. at 1257. 12 L. Ed. 2d at 286 . 
• 61 Stat. 151.29 U.S.C.A. §164(b) (1962). 
I> Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn. 375 U.S. 96. 84 Sup. Ct. 219. II L. Ed. 2d 179 
(1963). 
6Id. at 103. 84 Sup. Ct. at 222. II L. Ed. 2d at 184. 
7 Ibid. 
8575 U.S. 261. 84 Sup. Ct. 401. II L. Ed. 2d 520 (1964). 
4
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arbitration.9 While directing arbitration to proceed, the Court is 
not thereby precluding the NLRB's taking jurisdiction over the same 
dispute, since "[t]he superior authority of the Board may be invoked 
at any time."10 One commentator has referred to the case as being 
"something less than a sure solution to the several difficult problems 
inherent in the circumstances."l1 
§15.3. Section 301 suits. During its 1963 term ending in 1964, 
the United States Supreme Court decided three cases involving con-
tract actions under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act. One held that in a case in which the union was seeking to com-
pel arbitration of a discharge case under a collective bargaining 
agreement, no waiver of the right to arbitrate was to be implied 
because of a strike protesting the discharge, although the strike was 
a breach of the contract.1 
Another case, John Wiley &- Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,2 held (1) that 
in any arbitration case in which an issue is raised as to compliance 
with any procedural prerequisites for arbitration, such issue is for the 
arbitrator to decide, and (2) that a successor corporation is bound to 
arbitrate under the collective bargaining agreement of its predecessor 
corporation.s The Court frankly recognized that an unconsenting 
successor to a contracting party would n~t be bound to the predeces-
sor's contract under principles of law governing ordinary contracts, 
but it observed that "a collective bargaining agreement is not an 
ordinary contract" and "it is not in any real sense the simple product 
of a consensual relationship." The duty to arbitrate must be founded 
on a contract, the Court stated, but the "impressive policy considera-
tions favoring arbitration are not wholly overborne by the fact that 
Wiley [the successor] did not sign the contract being construed.'" 
Insofar as companies subject to federal law are concerned, this deci-
9 The opinion notes the two kinds of so· called jurisdictional disputes and then 
states: "If it is a work assignment dispute, arMtration conveniently fills a gap and 
avoids the necessity of a strike to bring the matter to the Board. If it is a repre-
sentation matter, resort to arbitration may have a pervasive, curative effect even 
though one union is not a party. 
"By allowing ,the dispute to go to arbitration its fragmentation is avoided to 
a substantial extent; and those conciliatory measures which Congress deemed vital 
to 'industrial peace' ... and which may be dispositive of the entire dispute, are 
encouraged. The superior authority of the Board may be invoked at any time. 
Meanwhile the therapy of arbitration is brought to bear in a complicated and 
troubled area." Id. at 272, 84 Sup. Ct. at 409, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 328. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Prof. Robert F. Koretz, Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1963 
Term, a paper presented to the ABA Section of Labor Relations Law, Aug. 11, 
1964. 56 L.R.R.M. 36. For other comments see footnote 52 of that address. Id. at 42. 
§15.3. 1 Local Union No. 721 v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247, 84 Sup. 
Ct. 773, 11 L. Ed. 2d 680 (1964). 
2376 U.S. 543, 84 Sup. Ct. 909, 11 L. Ed. 2d 898 (1964). 
8 The Court held that ,this latter question was a point of law for the court to 
settle. 
'376 U.S. 543, 549, 84 Sup. Ct. 909, 914, 11 L. Ed.2d 898, 905 (1964). 
5
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sion may affect the long-standing rule of Massachusetts law that a suc-
cessor is bound by a predecessor's labor contract only if the successor 
assumed it as an obligation. II 
The third Section 301 case arose out of an absorption of one com-
pany's business by another company, the employees of both companies 
being represented by the same union. The parties set up a joint 
employer-union committee to determine the question of seniority, 
and it decided to merge the seniority lists. A dissenting group of 
employees brought action in the Kentucky courts alleging that their 
individual rights had been violated. The United States Supreme 
Court held that although they had stated a prima facie cause of action 
under Section 301, they could not prevail on the merits because the 
joint committee's decision was within its contractual powers and did 
not involve a breach of the duty of fair representation. It will be of 
considerable comfort to both employers and unions to know that it is 
not a violation of the union's duty of fair representation for it to take 
"a good faith position contrary to that of some individual whom it 
represents" or to support "the position of one group of employees 
against that of another" in the absence of fraud, deceitful action, 
dishonest conduct, or "action based upon capricious or arbitrary fac-
tors.:'6 
§15.4. Federal decisions in Massachusetts. The Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit and the Federal District Court for Massachusetts 
had their share of labor decisions during the 1964 SURVEY year, but 
they involved no major developments. Perhaps of greatest signifi-
cance in this area is the fact that the NLRB continues to have a hard 
time in the First Circuit, with more Board orders set aside in whole 
or in part, or remanded, than are enforced, along with frequent 
caustic comments by the court critical of the Board.1 In the area of 
Section 301 suits, one case is worthy of comment. A union brought 
a Section 301 action in federal district court to compel arbitration 
under a collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment was allowed, and the First Circuit affirmed in a 
per curiam decision.2 The district court held that the existence of 
1\ Berry v. Old South Engraving Co., 283 Mass. 441, 186 N.E. 601 (1933). Whether 
the successor is unqualifiedly bound by all of the provisions of the predecessor's col-
lective bargaining agreement or only by the arbitration proceedings is open to some 
question. Compare United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 
(3d Cir. 1964), with Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 
(9th Cir. 1964). 
6 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350, 84 Sup. Ct. 363, 371, 11 L. Ed. 2d 370, 
382 (1964). 
§15.4. 1 See NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines, 333 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1964); NLRB v. 
Prince Macaroni Co., 329 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Gorbea, Perez, 328 F.2d 
679 (1st Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 327 F.2d 906 (1st 
Cir. 1964); Raytheon Co. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964). 
2 Shoe Workers v. Moranne Shoe Co., 222 F. Supp. 826, 55 L.R.R.M. 2521 (D. 
Mass. 1963), aU'd per curiam, 323 F.2d 870, 55 L.R.R.M. 2580 (1st Cir. 1963). 
6
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a remedy under the Massachusetts labor arbitration statuteS did not 
affect the federal court's jurisdiction. The court also ruled that the 
dispute was arbitrable but added: "This is not to suggest, however, 
that the arbitrator may not make an independent determination of 
arbitrability in accordance with the power given him under the 
agreement."4 
Among other interesting decisions were two that granted relief to 
individuals asserting rights against their unions under the Landrum-
Griffen Act,5 one case denying court intervention in NLRB election 
cases, in line with a recent Supreme Court decision,6 and a district 
court case denying a preliminary injunction to compel arbitration of a 
discharge, since granting this injunction would prematurely give the 
complet.e relief sought.7 
c. MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS 
§15.5. Employment security. Wheeler v. Director of the Division 
of Employment Securityl arose out of the denial of unemployment 
benefits to an airplane pilot who was idled because of a strike of the 
flight engineers, who were represented by a different union. The 
denial of benefits was upheld because the pilot was found to be "di-
rectly interested in the strike," within the meaning of the statutory 
disqualification provision relating to labor disputes.2 One is "directly 
interested" if "his wages, hours, and conditions of employment will 
be affected favorably or adversely by the outcome." It is immaterial 
whether the individual himself is on strike or is a member of the 
union which is on strike. 
Another Massachusetts decision under the same statute raises some 
interesting questions of legal theory.8 It arose out of the much-liti-
gated Worcester Telegram strike.4 The claimants, who had been 
3 G.L., c. 15OC. 
4 Shoe Workers v. Moranne Shoe Co., 222 F. Supp. 826, 828 (D. Mass. 1963). 
15 Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union v. Del Valle, 328 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1964), 
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964); Leonard v. MIT Employees' Assn., 225 F. Supp. 
937 (D. Mass. 1964). 
6 Alpert v. Star Market Co., 227 E. Supp. 459 (D. Mass. 1964), vacated as moot, 
57 L.R.R.M. 1172 (bt Cir. 1964). See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 84 
Sup. £t. 894, 11 L. Ed. 2d 849 (1964). 
7 Steelworkers v. C. F. Wright Steel &: Wire Co., 56 L.R.R.M. 2879 (D. Mass. 1964). 
In another interesting case the district court ordered arbitration although ,there 
was a protest strike in breach of contract. Street Employees v. Trailways of New 
England, 56 L.R.R.M. 2180 (D. Mass. 1964). In ,this case, the court had occasion 
to follow two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United S.tates, the Needham 
Packing case and the Wiley case. See nn. I, 2, §15.3 supra. 
§15.5. 1 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1083, 200 N.E.2d 272. 
2 G.L., c. 151A, §25, as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 554. 
S Worcester Telegram Publishing Co. v. Director of the Division of Employment 
Security, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 827, 198 N.E.2d 892. 
4 See International Typographical Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 705, 81 Sup. Ct. 
855, 6 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1961), rehearing denied, 366 U.S. 941, 81 Sup. Ct. 1658 6 
L. Ed. 2d 853 (1961). ' 
7
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employees of the Telegram, struck on November 29, 1957. The 
strikers were replaced, and the employment security director allowed 
the claims from February 16, 1958. As a result of NLRB and court 
proceedings, the strike was found to be unlawful as a union unfair 
labor practice. The Board of Review affirmed the director's allow-
ance of benefits, but the district court reversed. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court, in turn, reversed the district court, agreeing with the 
Board of Review. The Court held (1) that the Board was not re-
quired' by General Laws, Chapter 151A and the precedent of the 
Howard Bros. Mfg. Co. case5 to determine whether the claimants' 
strike was a violation of the National Labor Relations Act, and (2) 
that the receipt of strike benefits did not disqualify the claimants for 
unemployment benefits. In the Howard Bros. case the Court had 
held that employees who went on strike in violation of contract had 
"left [their] work ... without good cause attributable to the em-
ploying unit."8 The Court does not overrule this holding, but does 
not extend it. "We hold that the principle of the Howard Bros. 
Mfg. Co. decision does not apply to a case where the asserted im-
propriety of the strike rests only upon the determination of whether 
an unfair labor practice or other violation of the National Labor 
Relations Act gives rise to the strike."1 The Court noted the difficulty 
the Employment Security Division would have in making such deter-
minations and the inappropriateness of that agency's making them. 
The result is a sound one if, in fact, the original labor dispute has 
ended when the claims are filed, but is highly debatable if the strikers, 
even if they have been replaced, are still pursuing their strike by 
picketing at the time their unemployment claims are filed. It would 
seem that here, as in the Howard case, the basic question should be 
whether the provision in regard to leaving work without good cause 
has any relevance in a strike situation in which the leaving is in-
tended to be only temporary, not permanent. It would seem to make 
more labor relations sense to confine the leaving clause to the famil-
iar voluntary quitting category, which results in a termination of the 
employee-employer relationship. A strike does not have this effect. 
It appears from the Court's opinion that the claimants did not argue 
that they were entitled to benefits while on strike and prior to the 
termination of the stoppage of work but based their case for benefits 
after that date upon the theory that the stoppage of work ended when 
the company replaced them and resumed substantially normal produc-
tion. It would seem the claimants' theory is supportable, provided 
the labor dispute has also ended. The opinion does not indicate 
whether the claimants continued to picket after they were replaced. 
5 Howard Bros. Manufacturing Co. v. Director of the Division of Employment 
Security, 333 Mass. 244, 130 N.E.2d 108 (1955). The Court specifically cited the 
comments on the Howard case in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.4. 
81964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 827, 833, 198 N.E.2d 892, 897. 
1 Ibid. 
8
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In the light of the employer's right under federal labor law to replace 
economic strikers, and the repeated refusal of the Massachusetts legis-
lature to amend the statute to pay unemployment benefits to strikers 
even after a waiting period of some weeks, it would seem anomalous 
for replaced strikers to be receiving benefits while still carrying on 
picketing or boycott activities against the employer. It would be dif-
ferent, of course, if the labor dispute itself had been terminated in 
all respects. 
D. MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
§15.6. Nurses: Collective bargaining, strike ban, and compulsory 
arbitration. Chapter 576 of the Acts of 19641 is an explosive and pre-
cedent-shattering piece of legislation in the labor relations field. In 
extending the right of collective bargaining to nurses2 in hospitals and 
other health care facilities8 by including them within the coverage of 
the state labor relations law,4 the legislature also amended that law 
in these two important respects: (1) It made it an unfair labor prac-
tice for nurses to engage in a strike or slowdown at a health care 
facility, and for their representatives or any other persons to induce 
or encourage such strike or slowdown; and it also made it an unfair 
labor practice for a health care facility to lock out the nurses. (2) It 
provided for the compulsory arbitration of all grievances and disputes 
between the nurses and hospitals concerning wages, hours, and con-
ditions of employment. 
At least in recent years, no other state has declared a primary peace-
ful economic strike to be unlawful and subject to restraint in the 
absence of any finding of emergency or imminent danger to public 
health or safety. Nor has any other state enacted a compulsory 
arbitration law}! The first such law was the special resolution of 
§15.6. 1 Effective December !II, 1964. 
2 "Nurses" includes both professional registered nurses and licensed practical 
nurses. The statute provides, however, that the Board may decide ,that a "profes· 
sion" unit is appropriate and that "for purposes of this chapter, registered nurses 
and licensed practical nurses shall not be deemed to be members of the same 
particular profession, thus permitting separate units of each." Acts of 1964, c. 576, 
§5(b). 
8 Health care facilities are defined broadly to include all types of hospitals, 
including those which are governmental, nonprofit, or charitable; clinics, conva-
lescent and nursing homes, visiting nurses associations, public health agencies, and 
any related facilities. 
In 1946 nonprofit hospitals were held not to be covered by the state Labor 
Relations Act because they are not engaged in "trade or industry." St. Luke's 
Hospital v. Labor Relations Commission, !l20 Mass. 467, 70 N.E.2d 10 (1946). A 
bill in the 1964 session of the legislature to bring nonprofit charitable and educa-
tional institutions within coverage of the state Labor Relations Act for all purposes 
failed of enactment. House Bill No. 964 (1964). 
4 G.L., c. 150A. 
Ii The Massachusetts Schlicter Act, G.L., c. 150B, used various procedures includ-
ing sta'te seizure for dealing with emergency disputes but did not embrace com-
pulsory arbitration. See 196!1 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.5 for comment on the 
9
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Congress in 1963 requiring arbitration of the then-existing railroad 
dispute.6 As noted in the 1963 ANNUAL SURVEY,7 labor criticized this 
legislation as "the opening wedge to compulsory arbitration of labor 
disputes." Opposition to compulsory arbitration is one point on 
which management agrees with labor. If compulsory arbitration is 
extended to other fields, historians will note these limited beginnings 
affecting railroads and nurses. Legislators and the public appear to 
have far less distaste for compulsory arbitration than management 
and labor.8 Thorny issues are sure to arise if the statutory provisions 
are invoked, and constitutional questions may well be raised.S 
§15.7. Labor relations and public employees. Efforts begun by 
the legislature in 19581 to give formal sanction to unions representing 
governmental employees have been continued. A 1964 statute pro-
vides that the Commonwealth "shall grant recognition to employee 
organizations" and state agencies are authorized to enter into agree-
ments with unions "relative to conditions of employment" which do 
not conflict with statutes or rules and regulations.2 The state director 
of personnel is authorized to establish procedures for determining 
"appropriate employee units," and he is directed to use the Massachu-
setts Labor Relations Commission and the procedures of Chapter 150A 
(the state Labor Relations Act) for resolving "disputes or questions 
of recognition." Lack of such procedures was noted in a previous 
ANNUAL SURVEy3 as a defect in a prior law on this subject. 
This same statute declares a strike or slowdown by state employees 
to be an unfair labor practice and likewise bans the inducement or ' 
encouragement of such a strike by any person. There is nothing to 
indicate how such an unfair labor practice is to be remedied, and this 
provision has no cross-reference to Chapter 150A of the General Laws, 
as there is in the provision on recognition disputes in the same 
statute. If it was intended to make the procedures of the state Labor 
doubtful status of the Schlicter Act for other reasons. Even during the war, the 
War Labor Board's decisions were not legally binding on the parties. Government 
seizure was used if there was an emergency dispute. 
677 Stat. 132 (1963), 45 U.S.C.A. §157 (Supp. 1963). 
71963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.2. 
8 As respected a columnist as Walter Lippman has written in favor of com-
pulsory arbitration. 
S Does the federal pre-emption rule apply to the denial of the nurses' right· to 
strike or to the exemption of hospitals under the National Labor Relations Act? 
If the union shop issue is raised in arbitration, will the arbitrator force non-
members to join the union? This was one of the War Labor Board's most difficult 
problems, and it developed its maintenance-of-membership policy as a compromise. 
Are denial of the right to strike and compulsory arbi,tration constitutional? Is a 
statute giving collective bargaining rights to one class of a charitable hospital's 
employees constitutional if it denies the same right to all other employees of the 
hospital? 
§15.7. 1 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.4. 
2 Acts of 1964, c. 637. 
31958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.4. 
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Relations Commission available for remedying such an unfair labor 
practice, it is doubtful that it was further intended to make such an 
administrative remedy exclusive, thus depriving the Commonwealth 
of immediate resort to the courts for injunctive relief.4 Another part 
of the new law elaborates upon the right of state employees to form 
or join unions or to refrain from so doing and permits state em-
ployees to act as union representatives if their activities are not "in-
compatible" with law or official duties; the incompatibility is to be 
determined by the state director of personnel. The prior law on 
this subject was not repealed.1i 
In addition to this statute on unions of governmental employees, 
the legislature continued to enact statutory provisions covering many 
of the issues that are often matters of collective bargaining or person-
nel administration in private industry.6 For example, when a holiday 
falls on a Saturday, state employees are to be given the preceding 
Friday off with pay.7 A new requirement for the posting of "promo-
tional bulletins" before filling positions in the classified labor services 
is reminiscent of the job-posting procedures found in many industrial 
labor contracts. A member of a public library staff may be granted 
up to a year's leave of absence with pay for study or research, but with 
a novel proviso. The individual must agree in writing to serve the 
library for a period twice as long as the leave after returning, and to 
make a proportionate refund if he or she defaults.9 
§15.8. Employment security. Strikers not recalled to work within 
one week following the termination of the strike may now receive 
unemployment benefits if otherwise qualified.1 Several other amend-
ments to the Employment Security Act were also adopted.2 
§15.9. Sunday work. The so-called "Sabbatarian Amendment"l 
was added to the 1962 revision of the Sunday laws.2 A number of 
other amendments to the Sunday laws were also enacted.B 
4 Hansen v. Commonwealth, !l44 Mass. 214, 181 N.E.2d 84!1 (1962), noted in 1962 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.5. 
Ii G.L., c. 149, §178D. This includes "political subdivisions" as well as the 
Commonwealth. 
6 Some of the laws affecting public employees which were amended during the 
year were those relating to the checkoff of union dues (Acts of 1964, cc. !l4!1, 4!11), 
subsidization of contributory group hospital, surgical, and medical insurance for 
elderly retirees (Id., c. 461), and the purchase of stormy-weather work clothes for 
municipal employees (Id., c. 90). 
7Id., c. 42!1. 
8 Id., c. 521. 
9 Id., c. 150. 
§15.8. 1 Acts of 1964, c. !l55. 
2 Certain confidential records of the Employment Security Division will hereafter 
be available in the trial of homicide cases (Id., c. !l02), and changes were made in the 
provisions relating to election of coverage by nonprofit institutions (Id., c. 454). 
§15.9. lOne who believes that Saturday should be observed as the Sabbath and 
observes it by closing his places of business on that day may keep open on Sunday. 
2 Acts of 1964, c. 216. 
B The calcining of lime is permitted on Sunday (Acts of 1964, c. 9). The process-
11
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§15.10. Miscellaneous legislation. The minimum wage was pro-
spectively increased to $1.30 per hour effective September 5, 1965, and 
to $1.35 per hour effective September 5, 1966, both rates being subject 
to a new proviso making them effective for employees engaged in 
manufacturing occupations only when the federal minimum wage is 
equal to or higher than these new rates.! Payments to supplementary 
unemployment benefit funds are now to be included in the establish-
ment of wage rates to be paid on public construction projects.2 Age 
requirements have been stricken from the application for examination 
for nurses.s Employment agencies will be subject to extensive regula-
tions in respect to their procuring the employment of residents of 
other states as domestic and household workers in Massachusetts.· 
Oil burner technicians must take and pass an examination and be 
certified. Ii The penalty for willful failure of an employer to make 
agreed contributions to welfare and pension funds has been increased 
from a fine of fifty dollars and imprisonment of two months to five 
hundred dollars and one year.6 Any employer in construction work 
who requires or knowingly permits any employee to use stilts in his 
work will be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, 
with each violation a separate offense.7 
ing of laundry for hospitals, rest homes, and doctors' offices is permitted on all 
legal holidays, including those to which the Sunday laws apply (Id., c. 293). There 
has also been an amendment to ,that section of the Sunday law relating to ,the 
issuance of permits for Sunday work (Id., c. 384). 
§15.1O. ! Acts of 1964, c. 644. 
2Id., c. 609. 
3 Id., c. 21. 
• Id., c. 670. 
Ii Id., c. 680. 
6 Id., c. 467. 
7 Id., c. 233. 
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